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LOOTING: THE PUZZLE OF PRIVATE EQUITY 
Daniel J.H. Greenwood*
In 2007, The Blackstone Group (Blackstone), a publicly traded private 
equity firm, paid its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Steven Schwarzman 
roughly $350 million in cash compensation. Including the stock he received 
in connection with Blackstone’s public offering, Schwarzman’s personal 
compensation for the year was over $5 billion.
 
1
Five billion dollars is a stunningly large sum. For comparison, in 2007–
08, the Chicago public school system spent only $4.648 billion to fund 
44,417 employees, including 24,664 teachers, to educate 408,601 students 
in 655 schools.
 
2 Alternatively, Schwarzman’s pay, by itself, could have 
paid for a Nimitz class aircraft carrier (approximately $4.5 billion),3 with 
enough left over to operate Princeton University for six months—all 5,400 
employees and 160 buildings necessary to educate 7,085 students, publish 
2,000 scholarly works per year, run a 6.5 million volume library and a 
museum with over 72,000 works of art, and generally operate one of the 
world’s great research universities.4
In 2006, four American hedge fund managers—James Simons, Kenneth 
Griffen, Edward Lampert and George Soros—reportedly received more 
 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School. Thanks to Jim Fanto, the Journal 
editors, and my fellow panelists. 
 1. George Anders, For Now at Least, Blackstone’s Chiefs Decide Their Own Pay, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 26, 2008, at A2; Joe Bel Bruno, Blackstone’s Schwarzman makes $5.13B, HUFFINGTON 
POST, Mar. 12, 2008, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/03/12/blackstones-
schwarzman-m_n_91193.html?referer=sphe-re_related_content&referer=sphere_related_content 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2008). Blackstone Group L.P., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 134–36, 145, 
147 (Dec. 31, 2007) (describing $729 million award of vested Blackstone Partnership 
Participation Units; $350 million cash payments to Schwarzman; $4.773 billion grant of unvested 
Blackstone Participation Units; and purchase of ownership interests from Schwarzman for $684 
million). Peter G. Peterson, Blackstone’s Chairman of the Board but better known for his long 
campaign to privatize Social Security, received at least $1.4 billion in vested Participation Units in 
connection with the transaction, and payment of $1.9 billion for his ownership interest in the 
predecessor firm. Id. at 136, 147. At year end, Schwarzman was beneficial owner of almost 234 
million Participation Units, worth $7.24 billion at the initial public offering price, and Peterson 
owned about 45 million Units, valued at about $1.4 billion. Id. at 145. Prior to going public, 
Blackstone was not required to disclose compensation, so it is not clear over what period 
Schwarzman and Peterson received the interests that were cashed out in the IPO or what other 
compensation they received in earlier years. 
 2. Chicago Public Schools, CPS at a Glance, http://www.cps.k12.il.us/AtAGlance.html (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2008). Most data from fiscal year 07–08. 
 3. US Navy, Aircraft Carriers – CV, CVN, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp? 
cid=42-00&tid=200&ct=4 (last visited Nov. 22, 2008). 
 4. Princeton’s fiscal 2006 budget was $1 billion. Princeton University, Finances, A Princeton 
Profile 2007-2008 (2007), http://www.princeton.edu/pr/facts/profile/07/finances/; Princeton 
University, About Princeton University (2007), http://www.princeton.edu/pr/facts/profile/07/ 
about/; Princeton University, Scholarship and Research, http://www.princeton.edu/pr/facts/profile/ 
07/scholarship/; Princeton University, Princeton Art Museum, Collections, 
http://artmuseum.princeton.edu/collections/. 
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than a billion dollars each from their firms.5 In total, the top twenty-five 
hedge fund managers together cost $14 billion for the year,6 two-thirds as 
much as Wall Street’s entire reported profit that year ($20.9 billion).7
Is it possible that these men have actually earned the money they have 
received? Can one person contribute as much as, let alone five times more 
than, all the employees of Princeton University combined? Simplistic 
defenses of high executive pay are sometimes based on the claim that 
standard market models imply that employees must be paid their marginal 
product—that is, that the wealth these individuals have received must 
reflect the value they contribute.
 
8 The opposite is more nearly true. No 
plausible economic account of the private equity and hedge fund industry 
would lead us to believe that these money managers are creating new value 
greater than their executives’ pay. In particular, the “agency-cost” problem 
cannot be solved by adding yet another level of highly paid agents 
supervising agents, even if they are paid at unprecedentedly high levels. 
Rather than exemplifying the success of American capitalism, these funds 
instead epitomize the current crisis.9
The private equity sector is the most extreme manifestation of the new 
corruption. Corporations exist in a liminal zone created by two radically 
opposed moral systems: on the one hand, the competitive ethos of market 
and contract, in which no one is his brother’s keeper and only the minimal 
rules of fair play limit self-interest; and on the other hand, the cooperative, 
self-abnegating spirit of fiduciary duty, in which the fiduciary must entirely 
set aside thoughts of self in order to serve a greater cause. Corruption, 
 We are suffering from a new culture of 
private corruption. Our highly paid executives are not making money, but 
taking money. 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Jenny Anderson & Julie Creswell, Make Less Than $240 Million? You’re Off Top Hedge 
Fund List, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at A1. 
 6. Even in this elite group, inequality reigns. The highest paid, Simons, took home $1.7 
billion, while Soros, a piker by comparison, merely made $950 million. Id. The poor relations at 
the bottom of the top twenty-five received just under $250 million each. Id. In the publicly traded 
sector, top CEO earnings are usually quite a bit lower. According to the AFL-CIO, the average 
CEO of an S&P 500 company made $14.2 million in 2007, while by Forbes’ calculation the 
highest paid, Larry Ellison of Oracle, made $192 million. See AFL-CIO, 2008 Executive 
Paywatch, http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2008); CEO 
Compensation: #1 Lawrence J. Ellison, FORBES Apr. 30, 2008. Number 4 on Forbes’ list is 
Countrywide Financial’s Angelo R. Mozilo, who was paid $102.84 million in the last year before 
his company collapsed from a surfeit of mispriced mortgages. CEO Compensation: #4 Angelo R. 
Mozilo, FORBES, Apr. 30, 2008. 
 7. THE CITY OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2008) at 6, available 
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/omb/pdf/sum4_07.pdf. 
 8. In standard models of competitive product markets, at equilibrium price equals marginal 
cost; by analogy, in competitive labor markets supply should equal demand when employees are 
paid their marginal product. I know of no evidence that the world actually works this way. 
 9. “A year ago hedge funds were the omnipotent vanguard of financial capitalism.” The 
incredible shrinking funds; Hedge funds in trouble, THE ECONOMIST, Oct 25, 2008. 
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commonly defined as the use of public office for private purpose, can be 
understood as a breach of the wall between these two moral systems. 
In the last generation, executives have engaged in a sort of moral 
arbitrage, replacing fiduciary with market norms to justify allocating to 
themselves an ever-increasing share of the corporate pie. The private equity 
sector has taken this process to its logical conclusion; it has completely 
abandoned the notion that corporate office brings with it obligations. 
Instead, it openly celebrates self-enrichment over institution building or 
public service. Unfortunately, corruption is just as corrosive in the private 
sector as in the public sector. Office-holders who seek personal enrichment 
will nearly always find looting more profitable than construction and 
betraying co-adventurers more lucrative than genuine commitments. 
The essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain the normative duality 
of the firm and its relationship to classic understandings of corruption. Part 
II summarizes the rhetorical devices by which corporate executives have 
arbitraged between the two spheres in order to escape the bonds of 
professional and fiduciary duties. Part III applies this analysis to the private 
equity world: by re-characterizing managers as shareholders, private equity 
can authorize previously unknown levels of looting. Part IV explores the 
theoretical and practical crises that result. Private equity accentuates the 
“agency-cost problem” by adding another layer of managers with 
unprecedentedly high pay and increased discretion. Simultaneously, and 
more importantly for the economy as a whole, it heightens the paradox of 
the managerial role in a “shareholder-centered” theory of the firm. 
Successful corporations require trust: neither employees nor passive 
investors fully negotiate ex ante contracts. Modern conceptions of the 
“share-centered” corporation threaten that trust, by encouraging managers 
to breach implicit commitments to employees whenever expedient to 
increase shareholder returns. Contractual understandings of managerial 
roles, in turn, justify managers treating shareholders with equal cynicism. 
Private equity heightens the stakes. On the one hand, high-powered 
incentive pay promises executives extreme payoffs from successful 
exploitation of employees or other contracting parties. On the other hand, 
the private equity system offers ideological justification for self-interested 
looting by freeing managers from any residual sense of obligation to the 
firm itself, its employees or passive investors. Other corporate participants 
are likely to respond in the only effective way: by mistrust and withdrawal. 
The overall effect likely will be to reduce American competitiveness and 
economic growth prospects.  In short, on a practical level, the success of 
private equity threatens market collapse. On a theoretical level, the success 
of private equity delivers the final blow to whatever is left of the efficient 
market paradigm. 
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I. CORRUPTION AND NORMATIVE DUALITY IN THE FIRM 
A. CORRUPTION 
In the public sphere, we generally understand corruption to mean using 
public office for personal gain. Public officials, we think, ought to view 
themselves as public servants, dedicated to working for the public good. 
Similarly, competition for office between parties or individuals should be 
based on varying views of the content of that goal or how best to attain it. In 
corrupt governments, however, officials use the power of their office to 
enrich themselves, their families, their tribe or political supporters, without 
regard for their fellow citizens.10 Worse, once corruption, patronage and 
cronyism begin to dominate a system, each successive wave of office 
holders may seek to enrich themselves or their cronies as fast as possible 
before the inevitable overthrow by a new group, who, more often than not, 
seem to think that reform means no more than giving a new gang a turn at 
the trough.11
The most craven simply steal national or government property or take 
bribes, using their office to grab existing wealth rather than creating new 
projects. Slightly more subtly, others allow their cronies to overcharge the 
government for services that other firms or governmental agencies could 
provide more cheaply or competently. Boss Tweed’s associate George 
Washington Plunkitt contended that while this “dishonest graft” is wrong, 
the Tweed machine limited its own activities to “honest graft:” giving 
government work only to his supporters who provided just as good service 
as anyone else.
 
12
                                                                                                                 
 10. In Weber’s terms, corrupt officials act as if they “owned” the position, in the manner of a 
pre-modern enfeoffed estate. Weber distinguishes between officials who “may assume the 
character of an ‘entrepreneur,’ like the condottiere or the holder of a farmed-out or purchased 
office, or like the American boss who considers his costs a capital investment which he brings to 
fruition through exploitation of his influence” on the one hand, or in contrast, those who “may 
receive a fixed wage, like a journalist, a party secretary, a modern cabinet minister, or a political 
official.”  Modern expert bureaucratic administration, he says, “stands opposed to all these 
[corrupt or ownership] arrangements. Modern bureaucracy in the interest of integrity has 
developed a high sense of status honor; without this sense the danger of an awful corruption and a 
vulgar Philistinism threatens fatally . . . .  Without this moral discipline and self-denial, in the 
highest sense, the whole apparatus would fall to pieces.” MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: 
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 86–88, 95 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946) [hereinafter 
FROM MAX WEBER]. Cf. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
56–77 (1947) (pilfering resulting from failure to distinguish between public and private); John 
Waterbury, Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchial Regime, 25 WORLD POL, 533–555 
(Jul. 1973) (defining corruption). 
 11. For a recent review of the extensive literature on corruption, see, for example, Jonathan 
Hopkin, States, Markets and Corruption: A Review of Some Recent Literature, 9 REV. INT’L POL. 
ECON. 574 (2002). For a classic attack on crony capitalism, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell 
Address to the Nation (Jan. 17, 1961). 
 Generally, however, we frown on patronage and 
 12. KENNETH D. ACKERMAN, BOSS TWEED: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CORRUPT POL WHO 
CONCEIVED THE SOUL OF MODERN NEW YORK 2 (2005); WILLIAM L. RIORDAN, PLUNKITT OF 
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favoritism in the public sector, partly because government ought to work 
for the good of all, not just “stalwarts,” cronies, party loyalists or fellow 
tribe-members, and partly because, as has been noticed as long ago as 
Deuteronomy13 and as recently as the investigators into the K Street Project, 
Plunkitt’s distinction is not maintained in practice.14
Successful firms, like successful economies, require that employees and 
other participants view the firm as a team and identify their own interests 
with the firm’s collective interests.
 
In the private sphere, corruption raises almost identical problems. When 
corporate officials or decision makers treat their positions as licenses to 
seize corporate money, or to manage the firm in order to benefit themselves, 
cronies or protégés, the entire company, and indeed the entire society suffer. 
15 Just as patriots sacrifice for their 
country, soldiers fight for their platoon, and public servants work for the 
public, employees work for the firm, sacrificing for the greater good on the 
assumption that if the firm does well, so will its employees. Working for the 
whole, employees and other participants need not concern themselves with 
precise accountings of every contribution and every return on their own 
investments.16
                                                                                                                 
TAMMANY HALL: A SERIES OF VERY PLAIN TALKS ON VERY PRACTICAL POLITICS 3 (Signet 
Classics 1995) (1905). 
 13. Deuteronomy 16:19 is one of the earliest discussions of bribery still part of popular culture:  
“Do not pervert justice; do not favor individuals; and do not take bribes, for bribes blind the eyes 
of the wise and distort the words of the righteous.” Deuteronomy 16:19. Talmudic commentators 
pointed out that since the first clause of the sentence bars perversions of justice, the ban on bribery 
would be redundant if it only barred officials from accepting payment to change their verdicts in 
bad faith. Instead, the ban must be meant to bar even accepting a tip from the side that you would 
have found for anyway. Rava explained that tips and bribes make the official feel connected to the 
briber and thus makes him partisan. The problem is not merely bad faith, but a good faith failure 
to see when a friend is doing wrong. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Ketubot 105b. For further 
discussion, see NEHAMA LEIBOWITZ, STUDIES IN SHEMOT VOL. II 450 (World Zionist Org. 1976). 
 14. In the public sector, the civil service was meant to limit patronage – Plunkitt’s honest graft. 
In the private sector, however, we maintain the honest graft/dishonest graft distinction. Corporate 
directors are clearly permitted to engage in the former. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 
(Sup. Ct. 1944) (upholding contract with wife of President against conflict of interest claim); N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. L. § 713 (2008) (permitting nepotism and cronyism); 8 DEL. CORP. CODE § 144 
(2008). 
 15. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 773, 811–12 n.78 
(2004). 
 16. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A 
Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002) [hereinafter Team Production]; see 
HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA, NEW SERIES 386, 390–91 (1937) (contending that firms form to finesse 
problems with pricing mechanism). 
 Instead, they see its good as their own, much as patriots see 
working for their country as a privilege rather than a burden. When things 
are working as they should be, employees see the firm as a common 
enterprise in which all have invested, rather than a zero-sum game in which 
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the more the employer gets, the less the employee has.17 But if firm 
executives begin to use their positions as vehicles for personal advancement 
without regard to the common good, team spirit will disappear as surely in 
the private sector as it will in the public sector. No one likes to be taken 
advantage of, and nothing makes it as obvious that the team has been 
suckered as seeing their contributions to the collective enterprise lining 
private pockets.18 As ordinary employees learn not to trust their managers, 
customers learn not to trust producers, and economic actors throughout the 
economy cease to conceptualize the organizations they deal with as teams 
and allies, our corporate form of capitalism will be as damaged by the new 
corporate corruption as the bureaucracies of failed states are by the old 
culture of baksheesh, bribery and patronage. If every corporate executive is 
looking out only for himself, then Burke’s condemnation of the East India 
Company—which made many officials rich while destroying a country and 
losing money itself—and Adam Smith’s prediction that the corporate form 
can never succeed, will ring true.19
                                                                                                                 
 17. Cf. DAVID M. GORDON, FAT AND MEAN: THE CORPORATE SQUEEZE OF WORKING 
AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF MANAGERIAL “DOWNSIZING” (1996) (describing costs of lack of 
trust created by corporate “low road”). 
 18. Executive compensation has risen steadily and dramatically over the last three decades, 
even as median incomes have stagnated. See, e.g., David H. Autor, Lawrence F. Katz & Melissa 
S. Kearney, The Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 189 (2006); Lucian 
Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21(2) OXFORD REV. ECON. POL. 283, 
283–303 (2005); Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 49, 49–70 (2003); Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua D. Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What 
Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes? (AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper, CRSP 
Working Paper No. 615, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=931280 (showing that CEO 
salaries rose dramatically, but along with rather than at the expense of, other top incomes); 
Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International 
Perspective, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 200, 200–206 (2006). 
 19. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets & Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 
74 UMKC L. REV. 41, 46 n.14 (2005) (discussing Burke’s criticisms). “The directors of such 
companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it 
cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own . . . .  Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company. It is upon this account that joint stock companies for foreign trade have seldom been 
able to maintain the competition against private adventurers.” ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO 
THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 606–07 (Bk V, ch 1, para 107) (Penn 
State Electronic Classic Series Publication 2005) (1776). 
 
In the end, private corruption is even more dangerous than public 
corruption, precisely if not paradoxically because in the private sector the 
meaning of corruption is not always clear. While governmental officials 
normally accept that they should be public servants even when they don’t 
act like them, private sector executives have an alternative ideology that can 
actually turn corruption, cronyism and abuse of office into the highest form 
of virtue. In the private sector, the self-sacrificing ideals of service must 
always confront the self-interested norms of free contract in a free market. 
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B. NORMATIVE DUALITY IN THE FIRM 
Our bureaucratic, corporate version of market capitalism is 
characterized by a basic normative duality: The contract norms that govern 
transactions in the market are fundamentally in conflict with the fiduciary 
and agency norms that apply within the enterprise. The former norms 
justify self-centered egoism, while the latter demand self-abnegating 
altruism. 
The nomos of the market begins not with cooperators, but with the self-
interested, formally-equal strangers of classical contract law and neo-
classical competitive markets.20 If this is not exactly Hobbes’ war of all 
against all, it is at least the disinterested asocial isolation of Rawls’ original 
position.21 Contract law, unlike agency law, never requires anyone to accept 
another’s direction, to act on behalf of another, or to adopt the other’s 
interest as his own.22 This normative universe treats contracting parties as if 
they were equals even when they are not, in the manner of Anatole France’s 
law that in its “majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to 
sleep under bridges.”23 Similarly, it rejects agency’s common purpose: in 
the world of contract, no man is his brother’s keeper.24 The image is, 
instead, Abraham and Lot separating their flocks and each going their own 
way, amicable separation rather than familial fraternity.25
Under market norms, if I realize that a flea market seller is offering an 
original Rembrandt for the price of a reproduction, I’m perfectly entitled to 
buy it for the junk price without disabusing the seller of her error. More 
than that: I should be proud of my coup and others are far more likely to 
congratulate me for my astute use of my expertise than to condemn me for 
sharp dealing. Contract norms expect individuals to make as good a deal as 
 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See generally Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Margaret 
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate 
Law, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 1735 (2001). See also Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 
553, 567 (2001) (“[C]ontract law encourages parties to be self-interested while fiduciary law 
encourages them to be other-regarding.”). 
 21. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN Ch. XIII (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) 
(1651); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15–19 (1999). 
 22. Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 
273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Contract law does not require parties to behave altruistically toward 
each other; it does not proceed on the philosophy that I am my brother’s keeper. That philosophy 
may animate the law of fiduciary obligations but parties to a contract are not each other’s 
fiduciaries.”). 
 23. See ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE [THE RED LILY] Ch. 7 (Modern Library trans., 
1917) (1900). See also Hamish Stewart, Where is the Freedom in Freedom of Contract? A 
Comment on Trebilcock’s The Limits of Freedom of Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 259, 260–
61 (1995) (“Freedom of choice [is] presupposed by doctrines of contract law in that those 
doctrines treat the contracting parties as autonomous agents who are free and equal in the sense 
that they have an abstract capacity to enter into contracts.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 24. Genesis 4:9; see also Exodus 22:20–24 (setting out general rule of concern for others). 
 25. Genesis 13:8; see also Genesis 31:52 (Jacob and Lavan), Genesis 33:15 (Jacob and Esau). 
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they can for themselves, limited only by the thin requirements of not 
committing fraud or deliberately and directly physically harming another.26
The nomos of agency is entirely different.  Instead of “every man for 
himself and the devil take the hindmost,” this is the world of “all for one 
and one for all;” instead of sibling rivalry, this is the ethos of a parent 
shepping nachus from the achievements of her child; instead of 
competition, this is the world of cooperative enterprise.
 
27
In corporate law, shareholders are clearly within the market nomos. 
Shareholders, to be sure, have no contract with the corporation. But they are 
governed by contractual norms in the limited sense that they have no 
obligation to consider its interests. They are free to act in their own self-
interest without regard for the consequences to fellow shareholders, the 
corporation itself, or other corporate participants.  Indeed, shareholders may 
even use their corporate position to demand that the corporation dissolve 
itself, sell itself to another firm, fire incumbent managers or commence 
mass layoffs of less-privileged employees, abandon long standing 
commitments to products or services, and so on, without even purporting to 
make a claim that such actions would be in the interests of anyone other 
than the shareholder itself.
 A fiduciary is 
expected to set aside his or her own interests in order to work to promote 
the goals and interests of his or her principal, acting as if the principal’s 
goals were the fiduciary’s. When the same flea market Rembrandt seller 
comes to his art appraiser or a money manager, the expert is expected to 
immediately disclose the knowledge she has; her first responsibility is to 
protect the seller, even if she could profit more by looking out for herself. If 
contract and market norms are the rules that govern fair competitions 
between teams, agency and fiduciary norms are the principles that apply 
within teams: team players view benefits to their teammates as benefits to 
the team itself, and accept the good of the team as their own good. 
28 Shareholders are nearly always free to profit 
maximize without regard for others; the limitations, such as insider trading 
rules, are easily understood within contractual norms.29
But more generally, all potential corporate participants are entitled to 
take a contractual view when they are outside the firm. Thus, for example, 
employees and employers negotiating terms are normally governed by 
 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L. J. 1417, 1449–50 n.66 
(2004). 
 27. ALEXANDER DUMAS, THE THREE MUSKETEERS 91 (Jaques Le Clercq trans., Modern 
Library ed., Random House, Inc. 1999) (1844). 
 28. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (illustrating an instance of 
a shareholder acting against the interests of the firm as a whole). 
 29. This may not be immediately obvious, since insider trading is defined with reference to 
fiduciary principles (under current law, insider trading includes only trading done in breach of a 
duty of confidentiality). Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). The key is that insider 
trading is understood as a form of fraud – deceit or unfair advantage that is barred even in the self-
interested world of contract. 
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market and contract norms. Each is entitled, and expected, to seek the best 
deal he, she or it can get, without regard for the consequences to the other. 
The only reason for an employer to offer more than lowest wage necessary 
to attract qualified employees is because it is in the employer’s own interest 
to do so—as, for example, when Henry Ford decided to pay more than a 
market clearing wage in order to reduce absenteeism and turnover and, 
therefore, keep the assembly line moving more consistently. Conversely, it 
is not merely acceptable but admirable for an incoming employee to 
negotiate for the highest possible pay; it is when prospective hires accept 
less than that that we expect an explanation. Thus, when Disney’s board 
granted its new CEO, Michael Ovitz, an extraordinary contract, providing 
for “exceedingly lucrative, if not luxurious” payments even if he were 
terminated, the Delaware court saw a close issue as to whether the board 
had breached its fiduciary duty, even if it ultimately concluded that it had 
not.30 However, it saw no problem with Ovitz having demanded the 
“extravagant” terms.31
In sharp contrast, fiduciary norms ordinarily apply within the firm. 
Once the employee has been hired, he or she enters into a radically different 
relationship. Instead of the formal equality of contract and market norms, 
barring dishonesty but otherwise leaving each party free to make the best 
deal it can for itself in a “very Eden of the innate rights of Man,”
 Indeed, as far as appears from the published 
opinions, the plaintiffs did not make such a claim. A free actor in a 
capitalist market is entitled to get the best deal he can. 
32
The law views employees, including top managers, as agents—indeed, 
servants—of the corporation, and therefore fiduciaries for it.
 the 
employee is now governed by the asymmetric norms of agency, in which 
the agent consents to act on behalf of the corporation and subject to its 
control. 
33 Employees 
are supposed to work for, not against, their employers: like any agent, 
employees owe their employer duties of care and loyalty. Directors are not 
agents, of course, but they too are bound by almost identical fiduciary 
duties requiring them to work for the firm rather than themselves.34 For 
directors and agents alike, these duties are fundamentally similar to the 
norms of the public sector, requiring that corporate actors set aside their 
own interests and instead act in the interests of the whole.35
Fiduciary norms stem from the demands of cooperation in a common 
enterprise. Fittingly, given the feudal language of agency’s “master/servant 
 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249 (Del. 2000). 
 31. Id. at 248. 
 32. KARL MARX, CAPITAL 195–96 (Modern Library ed. 1992) (1887). 
 33. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 205 (2008). 
 34. See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co., DEL. CORP. L. & PRACT. § 15.02 (2007). 
 35. 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1460 (2008). 
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relationship” and the noble ideals of “finest loyalty”36 and selfless service, 
the agency nomos is also a hierarchal world of roles and limitations: agents 
act on behalf of their principals and under their direction, not the other way 
around.37 But our modern firms are more Weberian rationalist than 
medieval: the leaders themselves are also role- and rule-bound, meant to be 
renouncing “thought of self . . . , however hard the abnegation,” in order to 
promote the common enterprise.38
Corporations can only exist if they are governed by corporate, not 
market, norms: to outcompete markets, firms must do something markets 
cannot. As Coase pointed out long ago, markets will always be cheaper and 
more effective at being markets than bureaucratic firms.
 In either case, this much is clear: 
fiduciaries, including both directors and agents, are supposed to set aside 
their own interests in order to work for the firm, just as public sector 
employees are meant to work for the good of the country. An officeholder 
who uses that office for private enrichment is stealing. 
39
II. NORMATIVE ARBITRAGE, TOP MANAGERS AND AGENCY-
COST ANALYSIS 
 But that means 
that the line between market norms and agency or fiduciary norms is 
critical. Agents and fiduciaries are supposed to look out for the firm; 
contracting parties are free to look out for themselves. When fiduciaries 
concentrate on taking from instead of increasing the common fund, they are 
doing something obviously wrong and corrupt. When contracting parties do 
exactly the same thing, they are likely to be viewed as simply making the 
market work as it should. Appearances, however, are deceptive. If corporate 
actors see the firm as a free-for-all, we will all lose. 
One of the great stories of the last two decades has been the largely 
successful attempt of top managers to justify ever increasing pay by moving 
from agency to contract conceptions of their role. A couple of decades ago, 
Michael Milken went to jail, technically for relatively minor insider trading, 
but in popular opinion for taking a salary that was simply unconscionable.40
                                                                                                                 
 36. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (1928). 
 37. See Aladdin Const. Co., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins., 914 So. 2d 169, 175 (Miss. 2005) 
(“[T]he [essence] of ‘agency’ is that the agent acts on the principal’s behalf and is subject to the 
principal’s control.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the 
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another 
person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s 
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”). 
 38. Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 463–64. See also FROM MAX WEBER, supra note 10, at 196–245. 
 39. Coase, supra note 16, at 390–91. 
 40. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the 
Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 444 (2005). 
 
Americans have always made folk heroes of owner/entrepreneurs who 
make huge fortunes; there is nothing odd about an owner taking a quarter of 
the company’s profits (as Milken did) or even more, as Ross Perot, a 
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contemporary hero, did. But Milken labeled himself an employee rather 
than an owner. Employees are agents and an agent is supposed to work for 
his principal. On its face, a $250 million pay package seemed clear 
evidence that Milken was working first and foremost for himself. Insider 
trading or not, his very salary appeared fundamentally corrupt. Today, the 
uproar over Milken’s pay package seems faintly quaint. 
Milken’s successors have reframed CEO pay, emphasizing not the 
CEO’s role as an agent, but the moment before employment begins when 
the CEO negotiates his contract as a free and equal competitor in a free 
market. Under contract norms, any prospective contractor is entitled to 
bargain hard. Under market norms, he should demand his marginal product, 
like any factor of production, and the company should be willing to pay it.41 
So, if he can persuade the board that his management will make the 
company a fortune, he is entitled to be paid that fortune.42
The surprising result is that increasingly we do not even know 
corruption when we see it. Market actors, including investors and CEOs 
negotiating their contracts alike, are supposed to look out for themselves. 
Nothing is wrong with making infinite amounts of money in the market. On 
the contrary, it is a sign of virtue: under contract norms, high pay 
presumptively demonstrates an equally valuable contribution. After all, 
voluntary contracting parties should not give unless they receive in return 
something they view as at least equivalent. Moreover, in the corporate 
world specifically, black letter law holds that shareholders of a public 
company owe it a fiduciary duty only under the most extraordinary 
circumstances.
 
Private equity firms have taken this normative arbitrage another major 
step, re-characterizing managers as investors entirely free of any 
responsibility to the firm. With no normative constraints from agency law 
or team play, private equity managers are able, in complete good faith and 
apparently without rousing any significant social disapproval, to appropriate 
hitherto inconceivably large slices of the corporate pie. The simple change 
of title from agent to owner justifies, under standard contractual norms, 
their pushing self-interested profit-maximization to its logical limit. 
43
                                                                                                                 
 41. Standard microeconomic pricing theory contends that at equilibrium each factor of 
production will be paid its marginal product. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 503–09 
(11th ed. 1980). 
 42. This is a standard trope of the business press, which regularly credits CEOs with having 
produced the entire increase in stock market capitalization for the company during their tenure. 
See, e.g., Mark Hodak, CEOs Aren’t Overpaid, FORBES (May 8, 2008), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/entrepreneurs/2008/05/08/ceos-not-overpaid-ent-competition08-cx-
mh_0508hodak.html. 
 43. Haldeman v. Haldeman, 197 S.W. 376 (Ky. 1917); Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 
N.Y.2d 684 (1979); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The major 
exceptions involve controlling shareholders. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 
1971) (noting exception when majority shareholder seeks to divert corporate opportunities at 
expense of minority). 
 Private equity firms charge extraordinary fees for, in 
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effect, mining companies of every extractable resource. By any normal 
understanding, this is corruption: our major corporations are among our 
most important public institutions, and these officeholders are using their 
offices for nothing more than private enrichment. But by presenting their 
role as purely private market actors and investors, they evade the normative 
structures that would condemn their self-interested destruction of critical 
social institutions. 
A. BEGINNINGS: DEPROFESSIONALIZING MANAGERS 
The transformative innovations of private equity build upon the history 
of the past several decades. To understand the power of the new moral 
arbitrage—private equity’s conversion of corruption into perceived virtue—
it is helpful to understand the earlier transformations on which it is based. 
This section, then, offers a highly stylized account of the ideological history 
of corporate law since the rise of the “nexus of contracts” theory.44
Once upon a time, and it was only partially a fictitious time, corporate 
executives understood that their private sector positions are a public trust.
 
45 
The leaders of America’s great businesses were leaders of America; they 
were responsible for the welfare of thousands of employees and, in a larger 
sense, for great American institutions. Employment contracts for ordinary 
people at their firms were, at least ideally, life-time commitments, including 
retirement and medical plans that in any other advanced economy would 
have been key aspects of socialist state services.46 The primary goals of the 
position were public: economic growth, good jobs for Americans, and 
creating stable demand for products and stable sources for raw materials to 
keep the production machine running, the employees working, and the 
chimneys smoking.47
                                                                                                                 
 44. See Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
 45. See generally JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE 
REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS (1989) (interviewing directors and reporting that 
most directors believed that their role was to assure that corporations created good jobs and useful 
products or services). 
 46. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967) 
[hereinafter THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE] (describing managerial-employee coalition); see also 
John Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: Strains in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
23–25 (1986) (describing destruction of implicit contracts). 
 47. The commentators agreed. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For 
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1101 n.157 (1996) 
(citing literature) [hereinafter Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders]. 
 In those days, corporate executives were seen as 
professionals operating companies in the interests of their employees, 
customers and investors as best they could. Highly-paid as they were, their 
wages could be understood as payment for professional work performed, 
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not radically different from those earned by well-paid doctors or lawyers, 
or, for that matter, their own subordinates.48
Increasingly, however, top executives are thinking of themselves 
differently. In the new era, CEOs are learning to view themselves as 
freelance entrepreneurs rather than professionals—as self-interested 
maximizers in a fundamentally market or contractual, rather than agency or 
fiduciary, relationship. The workaday morality of the market invites actors 
to seize opportunities for personal advancement when they see them. Thus, 
executives in this role are entitled to make the best deal they can using the 
tools they have, including both their skills and their position, that is, their 
professional abilities and their control of the corporation’s decision-making 
apparatus.
 
49
The transition from fiduciary to self-interested maximizer is critical. I 
do not mean to invoke a mythological golden age. The CEOs of the 
professional, fiduciary regime were subject to all the manifold failures of 
markets, regulation, limited rationality, bureaucratic imperatives, cultural 
limitations and cognitive dissonance.
 As maximizers in a fundamentally arms-length contractual 
relationship with the company, they need to be incentivized to work in the 
interests of anyone other than themselves alone. 
50
                                                                                                                 
 48. In 1965, average CEO compensation was approximately 24 times that of the average 
worker. LAWRENCE MISHEL, et al., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007 fig. 3Z (2007), 
available at http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/tabfig/03/SWA06_Fig3Z.jpg. The 2008 ratio 
for S&P 500 chief executives, calculated by a slightly different method, is 344. Executive Excess 
2008, http://www.faireconomy.org/files/executive_excess_2008.pdf. The ratio of the average 
CEO pay to the minimum wage for a full time worker was 51 in 1965 and had soared to 821 by 
2005. Economic Policy Institute, http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_snapshots_ 
20060627. For detailed, long term data on CEO compensation in the 50 largest publicly traded 
corporations, see Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View from a 
Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005, 7, 8 and fig. 1 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=972399 (showing a general decline in the ratio of compensation of top 3 executives to 
median employees until 1970 and a steady rise thereafter to 110 in 2005. This number is lower 
than the MISHEL number in part because it includes the top 3 executives in each company, and 
there is dramatic and increasing inequality within that group. See id. at tbl. 3). 
 49. Courts clearly acknowledge that when a top executive is negotiating his contract, he is 
entitled to bargain as hard as he would in any market of strangers. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 47–8 (Del. 2006). In his role as CEO, of course, he is the 
company’s agent with a fiduciary duty to act in its interest and may not, for example, purchase 
shower curtains or ice sculptures with company money. See e.g., Grace Wong, Kozlowski gets up 
to 25 years, http://money.cnn.com/2005/09/19/news/newsmakers/kozlowski_sentence/ (describing 
curtain and sculpture scandals). But in a market, as Alchian and Demsetz noted long ago, all 
contracts may be renegotiated at any time. See generally Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 44. 
Kozlowski’s error, it seems, was not his greed but his bad timing. Had he demanded elaborate 
birthday parties for his wife during his contract negotiations, this would have been no more than 
tax advantaged self-interestedness, just as appropriate, if included in a contract approved by the 
board, as Ovitz’s contractual right to payment of a quarter billion dollars for flubbing his job. 
 50. See, e.g., DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST (1972) (describing 
extremely competent people making bad decisions). 
 Still, confusing the interests of 
General Motors with those of the United States, or the personal interests of 
the CEO with the interests of his subordinates, is different from believing 
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that it is more appropriate to ignore those interests altogether. The fiduciary 
accepts that she must work for the institution, however imperfectly. The 
self-interested maximizer is simply the private sector version of public 
corruption: a position-holder using his position for purely personal gain, 
without even attempting to consider the public or institutional interest. 
B. AGENCY CONCEPTIONS 
The de-professionalization of top management was accompanied by a 
cheerleading ideology that advocated “incentivizing” managers by vastly 
increasing their take from the corporate pie.51 Intriguingly, this rhetoric had 
at its core a confusion of the agency and contract normative understandings: 
it calls itself agency-cost theory, yet its rhetorical power stems from its 
contention that even major corporations should be understood as having no 
more public significance than any individually negotiated contract.52
On this account, corporations should be seen as entirely private, the 
consequence of a series of fully-negotiated bilateral contracts of the 
simplest, most self-interested variety.
 It thus 
rejects any notion of service, duty or public interest within the corporation. 
53 Virtually the sole concern of 
corporate law and governance alike should be enforcing those contracts, 
principally with the goal of reducing “agency cost,” understood to mean a 
sort of breach of contract: the tendency of managers to act on behalf of their 
own interests instead of the shareholders’ when they have implicitly agreed 
otherwise. The theory triumphantly vanquished any lingering sense of 
corporations as public enterprises, their managers as public servants, or 
corporate law as a subject of critical collective interest.54
                                                                                                                 
 51. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, 
But How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (May-June 1990); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). More recent 
commentary has been critical, see, for example, William W. Bratton Jr.,  Academic Tournament 
over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & 
JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004)); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive 
Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation 
Discussion and Analysis”, 30 J. CORP. L. 675 (2005). 
 52. For standard accounts of the nexus of contracts, agency-cost view, see FRANK 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996); 
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 313 (1976). The best critical account remains William 
W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1988). 
 53. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 52. 
 Corporations, it 
 54. The same nexus metaphor is regularly invoked in support of the (false) claim that the 
corporate income tax “really” is paid by shareholders: since the corporation does not exist, its 
nominal obligations must really obligate someone else. This position ignores not only the law – 
which clearly exempts shareholders from all corporate obligations – but even the logic of the 
nexus metaphor, which suggests, rather, that market conditions will determine which corporate 
participants ultimately see their private gains reduced by  corporate taxes. Since shareholders are 
completely fungible providers of a completely fungible commodity, standard pricing theory 
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contends, are purely private, appropriately dedicated to unlimited profit 
maximization. 
More subtly, and not as widely noticed, the new privatizing ideology of 
the corporation as a “nexus of contracts” began to erode the very 
foundations of the shareholder-centered understanding of the corporation. 
Agency-cost theory paradoxically insists that managers simultaneously be 
selfish beyond the norms of civilized society—and selfless beyond the 
demands of the most stringent of religions. On the one hand, the theory 
invokes contract norms to argue that managers ought to operate the firm as 
an extreme form of homo economicus, pursuing its profit at the expense of 
all other values and loyalties.55 Employees should be viewed as mere tools, 
to be coddled or exploited as the profit interest dictates, but without a trace 
of loyalty or friendship. National interests and social responsibility should 
be ignored; as Milton Friedman famously said, the only social responsibility 
of the firm is private profits.56 Taxes should be evaded—rather than 
acknowledging them as the “price we pay for civilization,”57 managers 
should view them as a cost to be ruthlessly reduced like any other. In the 
most extreme formulation, even criminal law should be viewed as nothing 
but a cost of doing business; if it is cheaper to lobby for an exemption, to 
evade or even flat out violate it, that is what managers ought to do.58
On the other hand, shareholder-centered theories demand that 
managers, having treated all their co-workers as means to profit rather than 
ends-in-themselves, must then voluntarily turn those profits over to 
shareholders. This is not a contractual view at all. Contract law suggests 
that parties are entitled to the benefits of their bargain and no more.
 
59 On 
theoretical grounds, it is hard to see how a bargain such as the one 
postulated by agency-cost theorists could arise: no one would ever 
voluntarily agree to give all the benefits of a bargain—the entire surplus to 
cooperation—to the other party. Indeed, we know from both introspection 
and repeated experiments with the Ultimatum Game that most people, most 
of the time, will prefer to do no deal at all than to give all the benefits to one 
side.60
                                                                                                                 
suggests that they should be paid no more or less than the cost of the commodity they provide and 
therefore that it is highly unlikely that corporate taxes ultimately rest on them. 
 55. See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY (2001) 
(felicitously referring to corporations as “externalization machines”). 
 56. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. 
 57. Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 58. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 52, at 319. To be sure, this position has a 
distinguished pedigree outside the corporate sphere, dating back at least to Bentham’s contention 
that criminal law is no more than negative reinforcement. 
 59. Goodstein Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 604 N.E.2d 1356, 1361 (N.Y. 1992). 
 
 60. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, A Behavioral Approach to Law & Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471 (1998) (describing Ultimatum game and research, indicating that people reject offers they 
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Moreover, the real rights of shareholders bear little resemblance to the 
imaginary contract postulated by agency-cost theorists. If shareholders are 
viewed as contracting parties, the contract they have “negotiated” is a very 
strange one: it specifies nothing to which they are entitled, provides for no 
time at which they are entitled to the fruits of the bargain (if any) and no 
sanctions if that time, like the Red Queen’s jam tea, never arrives.61 The 
“contract,” in other words, gives shareholders no contractual rights. 
Shareholders have no right to withdraw their capital from the firm or to be 
paid for it while it remains there; the decision when or even whether to take 
such actions rests solely in the corporation’s board.62
In the early years, the contractual implications were easy to miss, 
because the “market for corporate control” gave shareholders, or more 
precisely the stock market as a whole, a powerful mechanism for enforcing 
its will. If the stock market became unhappy with the way in which 
managers were managing a firm, it would bid the price of its stock down, 
and the firm would likely become subject to a hostile takeover, in which the 
company stock would pass into the hands of a single shareholder, which 
could then force the firm to conform to market demands. Managers seeking 
 As a result, the 
marginal cost of existing shareholders is zero, and, of course, in competitive 
markets, contracting parties should never be able to obtain more than the 
marginal cost of their product. Thus, a consistent contractual analysis 
should have suggested that, having bargained for no return, shareholders are 
entitled to none; having given up any right to withhold their services, they 
should expect no payment for them. The market for shares should fail, as it 
does in other markets where marginal cost is below average cost. 
Contract and market metaphors presented an even more fundamental 
challenge to shareholder claims, however. Shareholders are perfectly 
fungible providers of a perfectly fungible commodity: money. In a 
competitive market, a perfectly fungible commodity should receive no more 
than its costs—money should receive no more than the risk adjusted time 
value of money. Thus, even without entering into the details of the legal 
rights of shareholders, market theories lead ineluctably to the conclusion 
that shareholders not only have no special rights to economic 
(disequilibrium) profits, they have the weakest of all possible claims. 
                                                                                                                 
perceive as unfair even at substantial expense); Joseph Henrich, et al., Economic Man in Cross-
cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-scale Societies (Santa Fe Inst. Working 
Paper No. 01-11-063), available at http://www.santafe.edu/research/publications/workingpapers/ 
01-11-063.pdf (describing results of Ultimatum and related games in various societies, generally 
supporting notion that behavior is far more strongly influenced by normative views than by 
incentives or self-interest). 
 61. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, The Dividend Puzzle: Are Shares Entitled to the Residual?, 32 J. 
CORP. L. 103, 134 n.98 (2006) [hereinafter Greenwood, The Dividend Puzzle]. Much of this 
section follows the argument in that essay. 
 62. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833 (2005) (detailing shareholders’ powerlessness). 
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to avoid hostile takeover had little choice but to preemptively take the 
actions the market demanded. The market—non-shareholders as much as 
shareholders—through the power of price and the legal right to take public 
companies private, had the power to force managers to conform to the 
theory. 
Rhetorically, standard agency-cost analyses often avoided the problem 
by the deus ex machina of endowing shareholders with a claim to 
ownership or the “residual.”63 If shareholders can be viewed as the rightful 
owners of the firm, then the unfortunate fact that they have none of the 
rights ordinarily associated with ownership makes them peculiarly in need 
of legal protection. Similarly, if they just are entitled to the entire surplus 
generated by cooperation—if all other corporate participants are entitled to 
no more than they could get in a competitive market, which would be their 
marginal productivity in their second best use64
Thus, the rhetoric returned to the world of fiduciary duty. Traditional 
fiduciary, agency-based norms required firm agents and directors to set 
aside their own capitalist instincts in order to work as self-sacrificing team 
players on behalf of the whole. But if the firm is a mere “nexus of 
contracts” or a moment in the market, then it necessarily is not real enough 
—then they are in special 
need of protection, because ordinary contracts will never get them this. 
                                                                                                                 
 63. As more consistent theorists pointed out, ownership makes little sense in the context of a 
“nexus of contracts.” Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 44. Contract theorists, therefore, often speak 
instead of shareholders having bargained for a right to the “residual,” which is sometimes 
confusingly called “economic ownership.”  Other authors redescribed shareholders as “residual 
risk bearers” selling a form of insurance to the other corporate participants. The semantic change 
is not meaningful. Shareholders of an on-going publicly traded corporation do not control or 
otherwise “own” a corporation and they have no right to its “residual”: the core of the modern 
business corporation statutes is that the board, not the shareholders, determines the uses to which 
corporate assets are put. Nor would we expect anything different. First, in no other market do 
insurers claim a right to demand that the insured operation be run exclusively in the insurer’s 
interest. Second, shareholders do not in fact provide much insurance, at least for ordinary 
employees. When times get tough, firms seem to cut employment well before they cut dividends: 
employees, not shareholders, are the residual risk bearers. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Harvey 
Babiak, Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis, 63 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 1132 (1968) (for a 
similar point of view); John Lintner, Distributions of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, 
Retained Earnings, and Taxes, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 97 (1956) (reporting on extraordinary stability 
of dividends); Amal Sharma, et al., Companies Accelerate Layoffs: Job Cuts Spread to Blue Chips 
as Continuing Unemployment Claims Hit 26-Year High, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2008) (reporting 
that as recession deepens, companies are “eliminating jobs ‘as a preventive measure . . . . 
Companies want to make sure that they can keep their margins.’”). Another variant took the 
opposite tack, explaining the supposed right of shareholders to have the firm managed in their 
interest as necessary to counteract their special vulnerability to ex post exploitation. OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 304–307 (1985). This is no more 
satisfactory. Contractually, helplessness rarely leads to power. But in any event, diversified 
shareholders are less, not more, dependent on the on-going success of the corporation than other 
less diversified, more firm specific investors, such as most employees. See, e.g., KENT 
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE 
POSSIBILITIES 53–59 (2006); Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders, supra note 47, at 1065–1066, 
1093–1097. 
 64. Coase, supra note 16. 
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to be the object of fiduciary duties. By combining this incorporeal view of 
corporations with a mystical view of shareholders as “owners,” the 
traditional fiduciary duties owed to the firm could be shifted instead to the 
shareholders, understood in a fictionalized, role-based sense as a proxy for 
the stock market. Managers, it could be claimed, have a fiduciary duty to 
work for shareholders, which trumps their market right to work for 
themselves. 
But this solution is too easy. Contractual conceptions of the firm create 
a nearly insoluble ideological tension around the role of managers. To the 
extent that managers see themselves as in a fundamentally contractual, 
market-based relationship, they will see themselves as rationalist 
competitors in a capitalist marketplace—homo economicus, not fiduciary 
altruists renouncing thought of self no matter how hard the abnegation. 
Contract norms suggest that they will, and indeed should, put their own 
interests front and foremost.65
Unfortunately for shareholders, the law gives them only one important 
stick: the right to sell their stock to a single shareholder who will have the 
right to change the board of directors at will and thus have the real 
 In the contractual nomos, the normative 
demands of professionalism and agency ring hollow indeed. Instead, we 
should expect managers to serve corporate interests only to the extent that it 
is in their personal interests to do so. 
Moreover, the role of managers in the shareholder-centered contractual 
firm replicates the ideological tension. Firms succeed when they induce 
their employees to work on behalf of the corporate team; successful 
managers learn to create and maintain that team spirit. Simultaneously, 
however, the shareholder-centered conception of the firm teaches managers 
that they must always remember that employees are not the team at all. 
Rather, managers should be prepared to sacrifice employee interests 
whenever expedient in the cause of shareholder-value maximization: to 
create the illusion of a common enterprise while treating employees as no 
more than resources to be exploited. Not only does the contractual ideology 
teach managers that they ought to be looking out for number one, but their 
daily experience teaches them that common enterprise is an illusion, 
alliances are made to be broken, and those who succumb to the enticements 
of team spirit will quickly be taken as the marks that they are. 
Within the contractual conception of the firm, then, shareholders cannot 
expect that managers will serve them out of a sense of obligation or loyalty. 
Both ideology and daily experience work against those virtues. Instead, 
they must rely on contractual carrots and sticks to “incentivize” managers to 
act in shareholder interests. 
                                                                                                                 
 65. For an extreme example of using contract theory to justify managerial grabbing, see 
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
857, 868 (1983) (contending that managers should be seen as having “negotiated” for the right to 
insider trade as additional compensation). 
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ownership rights public shareholders lack.66 In the early years of the junk 
bond-financed takeover boom, the stock market used this threat of takeover 
to induce managers to break their old alliances and, instead, adopt the new 
norm of “shareholder value maximization.”67 Thus, stock market returns 
and top executive salaries both went up quite a bit faster than in the prior 
several decades,68 while presumptive tenure and related benefits were 
eliminated for both unionized and middle managerial employees, salaries 
below the top levels stagnated, unions were defeated, physical production 
was shifted first to non-union states and then overseas, the ranks of middle 
level managers were decimated, corporate income tax payments declined 
steadily from the early 1950s to the early 1980s, and both median income 
and the minimum wage stagnated even as labor productivity continued to 
rise.69
However, the poison pill and its statutory equivalents ended hostile 
takeovers and changed the balance of power. Since the early 1990s, the law 
has been quite clear that shareholders may exercise the stick of takeover 
only with the consent of the directors, who are usually under both the 
 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Corporations are under the ultimate control of their board of directors. Public shareholders 
have the legal right to elect the board, but that right is empty in the ordinary course, if only 
because the incumbent board controls the proxy machinery. When the firm has only a single 
shareholder, in contrast, the board serves at the pleasure of the shareholder, which may replace its 
members at any time. 
 67. On the effects of corporate governance changes on corporate profits, see, for example, 
Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United 
States: Make Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 132–33 (2001) (reviewing 
evidence and possible explanations for effects of takeovers, increased leverage and shifting 
ideologies). 
 68. Shareholders received an average compounded return of 15.24% per year in the twenty 
years from 1982-2002, far above historic norms. IBBOTSON ASSOCIATES, STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS, 
AND INFLATION (SBBI) YEARBOOK 47 (2008). More recent returns have been lower but still 
dramatic: the twenty years ending in 2007 still managed an 11.81% annualized return during a 
period when inflation was only 3.04%. Id. During the same period, top executive salaries also 
jumped dramatically. Frydman & Saks, supra note 48, at Fig. 1. Stock returns in part come from 
other investors, so they are best interpreted as a rough indicator that the stock market anticipated 
increased shareholder claims on the corporate pie. 
 69. See generally Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 67. On the diminished prospects of middle 
management and rank and file employees, see, for example, Coffee, supra note 46; MISHEL, supra 
note 48. On taxes, see, for example, Joel Friedman, The Decline of Corporate Income Tax 
Revenues, available at http://www.cbpp.org/10-16-03tax.htm. On inequality generally, see, for 
example, MISHEL, supra note 48; RICHARD WILKINSON, MIND THE GAP: HIERARCHIES, HEALTH 
AND HUMAN EVOLUTION (2001) (noting that inequality reduces health); ROBERT H. FRANK, 
FALLING BEHIND: HOW RISING INEQUALITY HARMS THE MIDDLE CLASS (2007) (exploring 
implications of Veblenesque argument that relative status, rather than absolute quantities, drives 
most desire for goods); ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILLIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL 
SOCIETY: HOW MORE  AND MORE AMERICANS COMPETE FOR EVER FEWER AND BIGGER PRIZES, 
ENCOURAGING ECONOMIC WASTE, INCOME INEQUALITY, AND AN IMPOVERISHED CULTURAL 
LIFE (1995) (noting that increased inequality causes social dysfunction). 
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influence and control of the very managers it is to be wielded against.70
In the contractual metaphor, there is little difference between 
shareholders offering carrots or managers helping themselves to them. The 
point is that markets will give the surplus to trade to those who are in the 
best position to take it. Managers need shareholders, but shareholders need 
managers more: money is fungible and managers are not. If the rules of the 
game are contractual, managers are going to win. Predictably, in the 
decades since the victory of the privatizing ideology, managers have 
received ever-increasing salaries and increasingly astonishing quantities of 
shares or options to purchase shares.
 
With no stick, only carrots remain. A great many carrots followed. 
71 Meanwhile, dividends—the primary 
way corporations traditionally passed corporate assets to shareholders—
began to decline even as reported profits increased.72 Observers contended 
that corporations were merely shifting to economically equivalent share 
buybacks to allow shareholders to avoid income taxes,73 but increasingly 
buybacks merely counteracted the effect of the ever increasing grants of 
stock to managers.74
In short, while corporate profits seem to have continued to grow, less is 
being paid out to shareholders.
 
75 Instead, the growing firm pie is going to 
debt investors (as interest) and top managers,76 even as less goes to lower 
ranked employees, consumers and taxes for the collective enterprise.77
                                                                                                                 
 70. See Moran v. Household Int’l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding poison pill); 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (upholding “just say no” 
defense). 
 71. Frydman & Saks, supra note 48. 
 72. E.g., Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo & Douglas J. Skinner, Are Dividends 
Disappearing? Dividend Concentration and the Consolidation of Earnings, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 425 
(2004); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm 
Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay?, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2001). 
 73. See generally Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, 34 J. BUS. 411 
(1961) (setting out the basic theory). 
 74. HOWARD M. SCHILIT, FINANCIAL SHENANIGANS: HOW TO DETECT ACCOUNTING 
GIMMICKS & FRAUD IN FINANCIAL REPORTS 143 (2d ed. 2002). In connection with the debates 
over the proper accounting for executive stock option grants, there were reports that various 
company’s stock buybacks did no more than balance out its employee stock grants. Cf., Eugene F. 
Fama & Kenneth R. French, Financing Decisions: Who Issues Stock?, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 549 
(2005) (finding that most firms in their sample issue and repurchase equity each year, but on 
balance are net issuers of equity). 
 75. I suspect that we will ultimately discover that the reported profits were, in many instances, 
mere accounting artifacts, but this remains no more than a hunch until after collapse. As one case 
study, see, for example, NANCY B. RAPOPORT & BALA G. DHARAN, ENRON: CORPORATE 
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (2004). 
 76. See generally Greenwood, The Dividend Puzzle, supra note 61. 
 77. The fact that profits have increased, if it is not an illusion, means that consumers have not 
received the full benefits of decreased corporate costs. Pay rates for the vast bulk of Americans 
have been stagnant for close to three business cycles even as productivity has risen. Corporate 
taxes as a proportion of GDP have declined steadily over the same period. In short, the benefits of 
increased corporate productivity have gone to a remarkably thin slice of corporate participants. 
 We 
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are approaching the predictions of competitive pricing theory: shareholders, 
having no rights to sell, will receive no returns from the firm. 
With firms paying out historically low dividends and stock buybacks 
only counteracting the effects of stock option grants to executives, the 
dramatic stock market gains of the 1990s did not result from corporate 
payouts to shareholders. Instead, they must have come from shareholders 
selling to one another. Perhaps the stock market stagnation of the last 
decade is a sign that potential equity investors have begun to understand the 
logic of the contractual equilibrium: Top managers, having overcome all 
countervailing sources of power in the corporation (with the possible 
exception of the bondholders), are now in control. All that is left is to 
legitimate that control by the trappings of formal ownership. 
C. PRIVATE EQUITY: FROM AGENT TO “OWNER” 
The private equity boom presents an important new step in our march 
towards a failed corporatism analogous to the failed states of the Third 
World. Private equity, like the management buyouts from which it 
descends, offers the chance for managers to escape the constraints of 
agency entirely. By becoming the shareholders of the firm, managers jump 
from servant to master, from agent to owner. By taking the firm private, the 
new manager-shareholders combine ownership with control and, for the 
first time, are entirely under contractual norms. As shareholder-owners, 
they are entirely free to use the corporation’s resources for their own private 
purposes, however short-term and however socially counterproductive.78
Classic agency-cost analysis bemoaned the separation of (stock) 
ownership and (corporate) control, because shareholders purportedly are 
more aligned with the interests of the corporation as a whole than managers. 
The premise seems false: standard portfolio theory teaches institutional 
investors to focus on the risk-adjusted present value of future cash flows, 
making time, space, expertise and particular projects entirely fungible and, 
in any event, mere diversifiable risks. Human beings and human 
institutions, however, can only exist in particular places at particular times 
with meaning derived from particular expertise and particular projects; 
unlike portfolios we are never fully diversified, risk-neutral or time-
indifferent. Since the stock market necessarily views the fundamental 
commitments of real human beings as mere diversifiable risks, its approach 
 
Like the kleptocratic dictators who destroyed promising economies around 
the Second and Third Worlds, they can become extraordinarily rich even as 
they contribute to the collapse of the world around them. The story of the 
golden goose misses the tragedy of the contractualized commons: private 
equity has learned how to get quite fat eating someone else’s goose. 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (illustrating an instance of 
a shareholder acting against the interests of the firm as a whole). 
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to decision-making is fundamentally inhuman and highly unlikely to 
promote those interests real people would consider most important.79
The source of Schwarzman’s billions is a novel form of legal arbitrage: 
a de-professionalization of management. Using the ordinary understandings 
of the shareholder role as disinterested and free of fiduciary duties, he and 
his cohorts have entirely freed themselves, and the managers under them, 
from traditional agency concepts of self-abnegation.
 But 
private equity has a complete answer to the traditional complaint: it has 
abolished the separation of ownership and control by making the 
controlling managers into significant shareholders. Unfortunately, this 
merely accentuates the real problem. Neither managers nor shareholders are 
closely aligned with corporate interests. Manager shareholders may well 
find that the easiest route to private profit is to loot, not build, the firm. 
80
III. PRIVATE EQUITY 
 As pure market 
actors, they are now free to appropriate as much of the corporate assets as 
they can get their hands on, regardless of the effect on the long-term 
viability of the institutions they strip, or indeed, of our capitalist system 
itself. And appropriate they have. 
Private equity firms buy companies, apply a short form-book of mainly 
financial reorganizations, and sell them a few years later. In the process, 
they vastly increase the pay of the underlying company’s top management 
and extract extraordinary sums for themselves. Their own investors also 
expect to earn above market returns, although it is not clear that they 
actually do.81
All this money can only come from one of two places. Either private 
equity has discovered a hitherto unknown advance in the science of 
management, or it has found a new twist on the oldest problem of 
organizations, corruption. The former seems unlikely, if only because 
private equity generally draws its expertise from finance rather than 
management; usually the pre-existing managers continue to run the actual 
operating companies. Absent evidence of the former, we must conclude it is 
the latter. Private equity funds are primarily devoted to transferring 
corporate wealth to private pockets. In the economic jargon, they are in the 
business of extracting rents, transferring wealth from employees, citizens, 
the government, and future innovation to a handful of highly paid 
managers. In the grittier language of politics, they are engaged in legalized 
theft. But the problem is worse than run-of-the-mill political corruption. 
Political bribe-takers, at least in this country and this century, normally 
 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders, supra note 47, at 1071–72. 
 80. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (1928). 
 81. FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF INNOVATION AND 
PRODUCTIVITY, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS: SYMPOSIUM SUMMARY, 
Feb. 29, 2008, http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2008/el2008-08.pdf. 
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recognize that what they are doing is wrong. Private equity, in contrast, is 
engaged in a sort of moral and legal arbitrage. 
Even after a generation of erosion, fiduciary and agency norms remain 
strong enough to pose at least a psychological restraint on managers who 
seek to take corporate property or operate the firm for themselves. But 
shareholders—the primary role through which private equity defines itself 
with respect to the corporation—owe no such fiduciary duties to the 
corporation; under both law and popular mores, they are ordinarily free to 
exploit their position in purely self-interested ways. By exiting the legal 
regime of fiduciary duty, agency and collective responsibility and shifting, 
instead, to the devil-take-the-hindmost rules of self-interested markets, they 
transform the moral valence. Corruption, thus, is redefined as normal, even 
praiseworthy, profit-seeking, shareholder-value maximizing market success. 
A. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY 
Private equity firms consist of a small number of managers who, on the 
one hand, collect funds from purely passive investors, and on the other 
hand, control the shares of operating companies.82
First, private equity adds an extra layer of managers. Public investors 
now invest in the operating company via two layers of institutions: the 
private equity firm and its own investors (which, because they must be 
“qualified” under the federal regulatory regime, normally are institutions, 
often representing smaller investors).
 They modify the 
standard publicly traded corporate structure in several distinct ways. 
83
Second, it reclassifies passive equity investors. Outside equity investors 
in the operating company are replaced by outside equity investors in the 
private equity firm’s investment fund.
 Operating company managers no 
longer answer to a board of directors elected by public shareholders. 
Instead, the operating company board is appointed by the private equity 
firm. Operating company managers answer to private equity fund managers, 
who make decisions as shareholders of the operating company rather than 
as its fiduciaries. Usually, operating managers also are granted significant 
shareholdings in the operating company in their own right, in order to 
“incentivize” managers to operate the company in the interests of the 
shareholders (i.e., themselves). 
84
                                                                                                                 
 82. See Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1148178. 
 83. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). 
 84. Usually, the private equity firm is a partnership and its executives are its partners. The 
outside investors are passive limited partners in an investment fund managed by the private equity 
fund. In at least one instance, Blackstone, the private equity firm itself is a publicly traded firm, 
with its managers as significant shareholders. 
 For equity investors, this means 
that there is an extra layer of managers between them and the operating 
company: they are clients of the private equity fund managers who in turn 
112 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 3 
control the operating company and its managers. Additionally, they lose the 
right to freely transfer their interests: private equity fund interests are 
always structured to avoid federal regulation of public offerings and often 
are not transferable at all. Instead, investors may have the right to demand 
their investments back at specified dates, often quite infrequent. Finally, 
investors have significantly weaker voting rights. As fund investors, they 
may have limited rights to vote to replace the fund’s management company, 
but in practice this will be meaningless, especially given the restrictions on 
transfer of interests. The operating companies’ boards, of course, will be 
controlled by the private equity fund managers, who vote the operating 
companies’ shares. 
Third, usually leverage vastly increases. Typically, the operating 
company will borrow significant amounts in connection with the buy-out, 
replacing equity interests with debt interests. Moreover, the private equity 
funds typically borrow significantly to purchase the remaining stock. 
Private equity thus operates much like the “pyramid scheme” utility 
companies of the Roaring Twenties: borrowing at operating and holding 
company levels to create total levels of debt that, Modigliani and Miller 
notwithstanding, would be hard to reach with a simpler corporate structure. 
As discussed below, this increased leverage unquestionably is a major 
source of private equity profit; it appears that the layering of debt results in 
firm creditors failing to fully charge for the risk they are assuming. 
Fourth, the claim of passive investors on the firm’s profits changes. 
Public shareholders have a rhetorical, but unenforceable claim on the 
“profits” of the corporation. In the private equity model, the operating 
company’s shares are held by the private equity fund and the operating 
company’s managers. The fund’s shares are voted by the private equity 
firm’s managers, who also supervise the operating company’s managers. 
Thus, unlike public shareholders, these new shareholders actually run the 
company. Accordingly, they have significant power to influence corporate 
decision-making so as to direct corporate surplus in their direction. The 
private equity fund’s managers, in turn, negotiate a division of the fund’s 
proceeds between themselves and the fund’s passive investors. This 
generally involves giving the managers the right to charge significant fees 
both to the operating company and to the investment fund (the latter is the 
famous 2 and 20 industry standard). 
Finally, and most importantly from the perspective of perceived duties, 
the new legal structure changes the fiduciary obligations of managers. In the 
private equity model, the operating company shares are held by the private 
equity fund and voted by the private equity firm’s own managers. Thus, the 
primary role of top executives is as shareholder rather than employee. As 
shareholders, the private equity firms are either arms-length maximizers or 
even the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties owed to the firm by its various 
participants. The normative frame encourages private, short-term, personal 
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wealth maximization with no need to take into account the future or 
interests of the institutions being managed or making investments except as 
influences on the managers’ own wealth. 
B. PRIVATE EQUITY’S INCENTIVES 
None of these changes have any clear connection to increasing 
corporate efficiency. They do not, at least in an obvious way, make it more 
likely that the corporation will be more able to provide useful products or 
services to the market at competitive prices or to provide good jobs at good 
wages. They do, however, mean that the top executives, both the old ones 
from the operating company and the new ones from the private equity firm, 
have powerful tools and incentives to transfer wealth to themselves. 
Most simply, the new executives can just pay themselves large sums—
incentive payments, shares and options, fees for services rendered in their 
private equity roles. But at least in boom times, the bigger bucks come from 
boosting the firm’s perceived profit and rapidly selling it at a value based 
on the promise of higher returns for the new shareholders.85
In the short term, a corporation can nearly always increase its apparent 
profit by squeezing non-shareholder participants harder. On the expense 
side, it can reduce employee headcount or pay, increase workloads or 
renege on promised future benefits. There will be costs in employee morale 
or institutional capacity, but in the short run they are likely to be minimal. 
Employees do not jump ship easily, and they may be inclined to accept 
significant worsening of their working conditions before quitting. Similarly, 
a company can mine its reputation: customer inertia will guarantee that 
cost-cutting measures, even if they seriously impact quality or performance, 
will not immediately drive away clients. Indeed, with a little bit of luck, 
competitors may match: if every airline shifts to cheaper schedules that 
 The issue is 
how managers will respond to these powerful incentives. 
Some executives, no doubt, will act as good professionals should, 
working hard to make the company as successful as possible. But it is hard 
to believe that this is the expected source of private equity’s outsized gains. 
Good professionals would already be doing this. Private equity firms do 
not, as a rule, purport to have special lessons to teach managers how to do a 
good job; their major innovations—higher debt and higher managerial 
pay—have not been news for at least a generation. Thus, it is hard to see a 
potential change at the margin here. Instead, the strong incentives are, I 
believe, structured to induce managers to do something else altogether: to 
abandon any lingering sense of professionalism and move wholeheartedly 
into the enterprise of extracting value. 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Private equity firms commonly agree with their own passive investors that at sale, any 
investment profits will be divided 20% for its managers and 80% to its equity investors. Operating 
company executives profit as holders of company stock or stock options. 
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work only if the weather is perfect, even when customers notice, their anger 
will be impotent. 
More generally, companies can shift expenses forward into future 
periods, for example by failing to upgrade technology or to invest in 
research and development. In many industries, there will be opportunities to 
accept current payments (and profits) in return for contingent future 
obligations; rather than providing for the future expenses it can simply pray 
that the future obligations will never come due or, if they do, will do so 
after current managers are long gone. If employees are willing to work now 
in return for promised future retirement or medical payments, current 
profits go up if the future obligations are ignored or funding is fictional. If 
counterparties to insurance contracts, insurance-like swap agreements, or 
guarantees of future performance are willing to rely on the company’s good 
name and credit, the current sales can be booked and the future expenses 
hidden. At the extreme, of course, this is fraud. But there is often a range of 
actions that are well short of fraud; more aggressive assumptions can 
rapidly increase current profits at the expense of a higher likelihood of 
restatements or failure later, just as leaner staffing cuts current expenses 
while increasing the chance that the company will be unable to meet future 
challenges. Private equity offers no new version of these games. It does, 
however, reward managers more highly for playing them. In the short run, 
these transfers of wealth will always be the easiest way to generate the 
extraordinary income of the private equity managers. 
C. “SOLVING” THE AGENCY-COST PROBLEM 
In sum, private equity offers a novel solution to the agency-cost 
problem. It adds an additional, and unprecedentedly expensive, layer of 
agents explicitly aimed at extracting the maximum short-term value from 
the underlying corporation with little regard for even the appearance of 
long-run proceeds or the interests of other corporate participants. But by 
characterizing these agents as “owners,” they change the frame within 
which they are ordinarily judged. Stripping the corporation for private gain 
suddenly appears to be virtuous, not criminal. 
The relabeling means, presumably, that our new robber-barons sleep 
better. They can view themselves as captains of finance rather than captains 
of piracy.86
                                                                                                                 
 86. Moreover, the generally fawning tone of the business press suggests that they have, or had 
up until the Fall 2008 market break, convinced the press to see them this way as well. 
 They can claim to be productive entrepreneurs, rather than mere 
masters of reverse Robin Hood redistribution, taking from the rank and file 
and middle class employees to give to themselves. And, of course, they can 
proceed further and faster than would be possible were they subject to 
moral qualms, but the damage is the same, or rather, worse. Corruption of 
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this sort—the abuse of office for private ends—is at least as destructive in 
the private sector as in the public one. 
In the medium run, private equity is likely to reduce investment and real 
innovation and threatens the American economic growth machine. In 
particular, as employees and investors begin to realize that the corporate 
world is being run for the exclusive benefit of a very small elite, they will 
be less willing to trust in its promises, thus threatening to undermine the 
very bases of prosperity itself. Our corporate system depends on the 
extraordinary capacity of corporations to create teams of professionals and 
workers willing and able to work together to plan and execute complex, 
long-term investments.87
D. CONSEQUENCES 
 Such a system depends fundamentally on trust and 
teamwork, and on each actor’s willingness to contribute to a joint endeavor, 
confident that he, she or it will share in the joint rewards. When the leaders 
of the enterprise routinely appropriate unconscionably large shares of its 
gains, the rank and file will begin to realize they are being scammed. 
In the long run, the problem may be even larger. All bureaucracies, 
whether public or private, governmental or corporate, depend on their 
employees acting out of a sense of duty and common purpose. No 
organization can exist if each actor is out for himself alone. Instead, 
successful organizations need employees who are willing to sacrifice short-
term individual interests for the good of the whole. In sports, we call this 
team spirit; in politics, we refer to it as patriotism or nationalism; in war, it 
is loyalty. Corporations require managers and workers who are willing and 
able to act in the interests of the firm. Players in the Ultimatum Game are 
willing to destroy the game in order to prevent opponents from 
appropriating unfair shares of the gains to cooperation.88 If employees begin 
to feel that they are not getting a fair shake, we should expect that they will 
respond in kind, and we will all suffer the consequences.89
A firm made up only of rational self-interest maximizers would fail for 
the same reasons that led Adam Smith to conclude that the corporate form 
would never succeed: each office-holder would be seeking corporate 
opportunities that he or she could seize privately, selling corporate assets 
 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See generally Coase, supra note 16; JAMES K. GALBRAITH, THE PREDATOR STATE: HOW 
CONSERVATIVES ABANDONED THE FREE MARKET AND WHY LIBERALS SHOULD TOO (2008); 
THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE, supra note 46; PETER A. HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, EDS. VARIETIES 
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 88. Jolls, supra note 60. 
 89. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); TOM TYLER AND STEVEN L. 
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BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2000) (showing that employees steal more company pens when they 
feel that managers are paying themselves excessively). 
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and contracts to the highest bidder or briber, working for the firm only to 
the extent that it would improve his or her resume (and even then only if the 
future job prospects outweighed the present theft, diversion or goof-off 
possibilities). With no sense of personal connection or duty to the firm and 
only the morality of strangers to restrain office holders, only fear would 
keep officers working. “In the groves of their academy,” said Burke, “at the 
end of every vista, you see nothing but the gallows.”90
In corporations, the duality of market and fiduciary norms is critical. 
Corporations can out-compete unorganized markets, despite internalizing 
costs of information gathering, supervision and planning that could be left 
to the market, only because, by commanding the loyalty of employees who 
accept the agency-fiduciary norms, they have an economy of scale.
 
Burke’s complaint was that basing social order on calculated fear 
makes for an ugly, unpleasant society. After the experiences of the 
twentieth century, we can definitively add that for all its ugliness, it does 
not even work. Fear creates resentment and resistance, not legitimacy. 
Rational self-interest mediated by fear of firing and anticipation of great 
rewards is the route to Enron or the extraordinary corruption of the late 
Ottoman Empire or the failures of the Soviet Union and its cronyist 
successor, not to productive or useful enterprises. 
91
Top executives who view themselves as free agents bound only by 
contract or market norms have a startling ability and incentive to 
appropriate corporate assets for their personal use. The ability stems from 
the usual norms of corporate governance and the reality of managerial 
autonomy. Top corporate managers set the corporation’s short and long 
term goals, the time-frame in which to fulfill them, and the means the 
corporation will use to reach its ends.
 By 
creating teams with conscious systems for internal decision-making, they 
are able to work more steadily and more constructively than markets driven 
by individual interests and herd behavior. However, if corporate 
participants ignore their fiduciary obligations, the firm will not survive, or 
at least will not prosper. A corporation composed of individuals who pursue 
their own interests loses one of its key advantages over a market, even if its 
employees—now acting as free agents—restrain their actions within the 
limits of market norms. 
92
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 Corporate assets, including any 
economic surplus, belong to the corporation, and top managers normally 
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control the corporation’s decision-making.93 This is perhaps the key source 
of the success of the corporate form.94
But that very managerial discretion also means that managers who view 
themselves as entitled to direct the corporation in ways that will maximize 
their own personal interests can simply cause the corporation to pay 
themselves more. Self-interested executives, whether labeled employees, 
shareholders or private equity managers, will often find it in their interest to 
seize a larger share of the corporate pie even if the net result is to make the 
pie smaller. CEOs generally operate on extremely short-term time frames, 
since they are, almost by definition, near the end of their careers.
 
95
Moreover, even if damage has begun to affect the company, accounting 
norms are usually flexible enough to allow managers to conceal problems 
for a few quarters with relatively little trouble.
 Private 
equity norms, which expect that the company will be sold within a 
relatively short period, accentuate this short-termism. As any game 
theoretician knows, in the end game, defection is often the privately 
maximizing move. 
Even if pay becomes so excessive that it damages the corporation by 
not merely appropriating corporate surplus, but actually interfering with its 
ability to invest for the future and to retain the loyalty of lower-echelon 
employees necessary to continued effective production, the damage is likely 
to be delayed until the executives can avoid responsibility. It takes a while 
for employees to build up enough resentment to quit or find ways to 
maximize their personal interests at the expense of the corporation, and it 
takes longer for customers, suppliers and investors to notice the changes 
and adjust their own behavior. Inadequate investment is likely to lead to 
reduced competitiveness in the next product cycle, but the consequences 
may be well beyond the relevant time frame. 
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 Indeed, even in the absence 
of serious problems, executives have a strong incentive to borrow from the 
future in order to improve current appearances: a few artificially good years 
followed by a bad year to catch up will invariably produce higher bonuses 
than a run of average performance, even if the CEO is unable to depart 
before the crash. If the CEO is lucky or smart enough to exit early, even his 
reputation may be safe. The true genius of Citigroup’s Weill or GE’s Welch 
was in knowing when to exit; had Enron’s Lay departed after his 1999 pay 
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package of $42 million,97
Nor is legal intervention much of a deterrent. Criminal prosecution is so 
rare that ordinary folk-statistics would lead many executives to disregard it 
entirely, as people normally do with highly unlikely catastrophes.
 he might well have ended his life as a rich hero 
too. 
98 CEOs, 
in any event, are more likely than ordinary citizens to disregard highly 
unusual prosecutions as reasons to change behavior. First, extreme 
optimism is normally a prerequisite for success as a business leader and the 
experience of repeated success is likely to breed a certain degree of hubris. 
Second, and even more importantly, the custom is for CEOs to surround 
themselves with subordinates and, since they largely choose their board 
members, even superiors with similar world-views.99
IV. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CRISES 
 Thus, CEOs who view 
themselves as free agents are likely to be surrounded by others who agree. 
Any contrary view, which will underpin any potential lawsuit, is likely to 
simply slip from view. Criminal prosecution and civil suits, accordingly, 
will seem not merely unlikely but unjust and unjustified as well. 
The value of publicly traded stock is almost entirely a function of 
shareholders’ belief that companies will be managed in their interests, at 
least to some degree. This follows from the most conventional theory of 
stock valuation: the price of publicly traded stock ought to reflect the 
market’s guess of the present discounted value of future cash flows that will 
accrue to shareholders (i.e., future dividends and stock buybacks).100
Under current law, shareholders have virtually no rights or power to 
force public companies to turn over any part of the corporate pie to them so 
long as it remains public.
 
101 Thus, if they were to conclude that managers 
no longer feel morally obligated to voluntarily turn over corporate assets to 
shareholders, rational investors would value shares at little more than 
takeover value. But the threat of a hostile takeover is a weak reed on which 
to build value. Current law gives incumbent managers and directors a 
virtual veto over takeovers, so bidders seeking to complete a takeover must, 
in the end, win the support of directors.102
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 In contrast, unorganized 
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shareholders can be counted on to accept virtually any bid that is higher 
than projected value under incumbent management. Thus, bidders should 
quickly realize that the real competition is for the support of managers, not 
shareholders, and should bid up the value offered the former rather than the 
latter. 
In short, without faith in managerial good faith, investors would quickly 
withdraw from the public stock market. Much as in nineteenth century 
America or many other countries today, public stock markets would shrink 
to an exceptional and ineffective source of corporate finance.103 As Jensen 
predicted at the height of the 1980s buyout boom, but for entirely different 
reasons, the publicly-traded corporation would wither away, replaced by 
closely held, debt financed firms.104 Bond markets, banks, or even private 
equity funds and other institutional investors would be the primary 
mechanisms for recycling personal savings, domestic and foreign corporate 
profits and sovereign-held dollar wealth into the corporate sector, making 
our system much closer to our European rivals.105
In the end, investors in private equity funds are no more powerful and 
no less fungible than investors in public equity. Since they are investing in 
the same productive function and with essentially the same rights, private 
equity passive investors should earn no more than public equity investors, 
at least if the equity markets are reasonably competitive. So, if the reason 
public shareholders can expect returns is that some managers and directors 
 
The private equity funds, by accelerating the de-professionalization of 
the managerial class and the rape and pillage of our productive 
corporations, increase the pressure on the public equity system while also 
seeming to provide a solution to the agency-cost problem. But the solution 
won’t hold: managers trained to steal from the largely defenseless market 
actors who make up the portfolio company should find no difficulty in 
applying the same normative principles and methods to defoliate passive 
investors in their own private equity funds. 
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of publicly-traded companies still feel constrained by agency norms to give 
them a gift they have no power to take, passive investors in private equity 
funds should shudder indeed. Their managers have no such qualms. To be 
sure, as in every Ponzi scheme, early investors may make money because it 
is necessary to attract the next set of marks. But soon enough, investors 
should discover that giving money to purely self-interested wealth 
maximizers with no enforceable obligation to return it is an unlikely path to 
riches; at least for the investors. 
In sum, four distinctions seem important between the private equity 
investor and the public equity investor. First, before private equity investors 
receive a share of the surplus to corporate cooperation, a new layer of 
heavily compensated executives will take their cut.106 Second, and even 
more unfortunately, both the private equity executives and the underlying 
operational management will, in the private equity arrangement, be able to 
think of themselves plausibly as owners or free contractors, rather than 
servants. Third, whereas corporations have no obligation to distribute 
profits to shareholders at any time, private equity funds usually exist only 
for a set period, often a decade. At the end of that period, managers will 
face an actual date of reckoning.107
Fourth, as a practical matter, the private equity funds add leverage. The 
general view is that this is the main source of their success and I have no 
doubt that this conventional wisdom is largely correct.
 This eliminates the Red Queen’s game 
(jam every other day but never jam today), but at the cost of worsening the 
end-game problem. Instead of an ever receding horizon, investors face 
imminent defection. 
108 Private equity 
firms buy companies; hedge funds buy, sell or short securities and 
derivatives. However, both use the same technique: small amounts of equity 
are multiplied by large amounts of borrowing. Imagine that a fund buys a 
$100 million company with a profit rate of 6% (or a security with an 
expected return of 6%), paying for it with $95 million in borrowed funds 
costing 4% in interest and $5 million in funds contributed by its limited 
partners. If all goes as planned, the company earns $6 million, of which 
$3.8 million goes to the lenders as interest. The remaining $2.2 million is 
available for the fund. If the fund management company charges the 
standard “2 and 20” – i.e., 2% of the funds under management plus 20% of 
the profits,109
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 it takes $540,000, most or all of which will fund its own 
managers’ pay, leaving the fund investors with $1.6 million, a 33% net 
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return on their $5 million investment. Nothing to sneeze at, and not very 
difficult, assuming they can find a lender foolish enough to finance the deal. 
That last point, though, is the issue. 
Theoretically, this is a bit of a puzzle: Modigliani and Miller taught us 
50 years ago that debt inside the firm is effectively identical to debt outside 
the firm.110 Accordingly, assuming that the market desires more leverage, 
we would expect to see why firms assume debt internally or institutional 
shareholders assume it at their level. Using a private equity firm to assume 
additional debt at an intermediate level appears both superfluous and 
unnecessarily expensive.111 Moreover, since the debt here assumes 
essentially all the downside, but little of the upside,112
The simplest explanation appears to be market myopia.
 it is hard to see why 
it should be priced at a mere 4%. The junk bond rates of the 1980s would 
make more sense (but would make the likelihood of 33% returns for the 
equity rather low). 
113
Modigliani and Miller make clear that this behavior is irrational.
 For some 
reason, lenders have trouble assessing the full degree of leverage associated 
with complex investments—they are more willing to loan at a lower interest 
rate if some of the loan goes to the operating company, some to the private 
equity firm and some to the private equity firm’s investors, than they would 
be if the loan was split only two ways. 
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 But 
our recent securitization bubble suggests that it is predictable nonetheless. 
Lenders seem to have consistently treated formal separations as real, 
treating highly correlated (or, as in this case, functionally inseparable) 
investments as if they were independent and thus a form of risk-reducing 
diversification. A bank that can believe that it has reduced its risk by 
securitizing a loan and then purchasing the securities using its own 
securities investment vehicle, or by lending a customer money so that the 
customer (or the customer’s customer) can purchase the securities, or by 
purchasing default insurance from a counterparty that is as exposed to the 
122 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 3 
risk of default as it itself is, is a bank that is likely to believe that if it lends 
to only one level of the private equity structure, it can safely ignore the 
leverage in the other levels.115
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The short run success of private equity thus seems to rely on two 
things: first, an optical illusion that allows it to borrow at rates that do not 
reflect the true risk involved, and second, normative arbitrage that frees 
managers from any concern with the future welfare of the firm or its other 
participants. In the medium run, we should expect lenders to correct their 
interest rates and equity investors to notice that adding another layer of 
agents, particularly agents who view themselves as entrepreneurs, is not 
likely to solve the agency-cost problem. The long run effect of the private 
equity firms should be to hasten a crisis of faith in the public equity 
markets, leading to investor withdrawal from the equity markets. 
Employees, unlike equity investors, have no practical way to withdraw 
from the corporate sector fully. However, any employee can withdraw in 
part at any time: any employee can work harder or less hard, choose to act 
in the interests of the company voluntarily or see those interests as entirely 
antithetical to his or her own. Successful companies convince employees to 
see the company as a team and themselves as team members who ought to 
sacrifice for the good of the whole. If employees conclude that the company 
treats only top managers as members of the team, while everyone else is a 
mere tool to be exploited, they are likely to begin to reframe their team 
understandings. People in general are quite sensitive to, and resentful of, 
unfair treatment, and few actions are more universally viewed as unfair as 
betraying the team. 
In the longer run, our growing culture of corruption, the de-
professionalization of the managerial elite and the collapse of the distinction 
between the realms of agency and contract are likely to cause regular 
financial or political crises if not brought under regulatory control first. 
Unless, of course, the current credit crunch is sufficiently long lasting to 
eliminate the leverage opportunities that seem to be essential for this 
particular skim game. 
The success of private equity firms challenges mainstream corporate 
governance theory: according to standard agency cost analysis, this should 
not have happened. Agency problems—the shorthand term for the tendency 
of fiduciaries in a capitalist system to work for themselves as well as, or 
instead of, their clients—cannot be solved by adding an additional layer of 
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extremely highly paid agents supported by an ideology that justifies the 
most extreme forms of self-interestedness. Therefore, private equity is 
unlikely to be an innovative solution to the age-old agency problem. 
Instead, it is better understood as a clever bit of legal arbitrage: by 
reclassifying agents as principals, it allows former fiduciaries to instead 
view themselves, and be viewed by others, as entitled to look out only for 
themselves. And look out for themselves they have: the private equity 
managers have extracted hitherto unseen sums from our corporations, 
appropriating for the private benefit of a handful of individuals surplus that 
otherwise might have gone to other corporate participants, including 
consumers, ordinary employees, taxpayers and investors in the public 
securities markets, or might have been devoted to increasing productivity or 
innovation for the benefit of future generations. 
Moreover, private equity challenges the remnants of the efficient capital 
market hypothesis and the security pricing models with which it is 
associated: in a capital market that worked even moderately like our 
competitive models, these firms should have quickly been driven out of 
business. Rational investors should understand that in a competitive capital 
market, passive investors will be paid only for assuming undiversifiable 
risk. When private equity funds promise above market returns, therefore, 
there are only two choices within a competitive model: either they are lying 
or they are adding risk. Most hedge funds claim not to be adding risk—
”hedging” is a method of reducing risk. Investors ought therefore to refuse 
to invest with them—liars are never good bets. Moreover, to the extent that 
hedge funds admit that the above market returns they promise will be 
associated with above market likelihood of extreme losses, most investors 
ought, again, to reject the offer. In a world that looked like the competitive 
markets of the efficient capital market hypothesis, these firms wouldn’t 
exist; it follows then that our world differs in some way. 
The basic private equity technique, like the basic hedge fund technique, 
appears to be to borrow money in order to increase potential returns or 
losses. If the loans were correctly priced, this would not create new value 
under standard valuation theories, nor would it be a service that could 
possibly warrant the high fees typically charged in the hedge fund and 
private equity worlds. The simplest explanation is that either lenders or 
fund investors are mispricing risk and have done so for several years at a 
stretch, contrary to the claims of the efficient market theorists. 
This explanation suggests, moreover, that private equity is simply the 
modern equivalent of the pyramid schemes, margin loans and highly 
leveraged utility holding companies of the 1920s. Like those earlier edifices 
built on borrowed money, the contemporary schemes are likely to be highly 
unstable: if the underlying assets decline in value or fail to provide expected 
income by even small margins, the lenders are likely to take losses out of 
scale with their potential profits. Once lenders wake up to this possibility—
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most likely only after losses have begun—they are likely to cut back 
lending rapidly, which will, in turn, make the underlying assets both less 
valuable and less saleable still, thus beginning a new round of lender panic. 
Any minor downturn, in short, runs the risk of starting a self-reinforcing 
cycle of credit and business contraction. The rise of private equity in its 
present form, then, appears to be another step towards the pre-New Deal 
world of inequality and instability. 
Once we have abandoned the simplest economic models, however, 
other interesting implications abound beyond the well-understood, if 
recently ignored, problems of pyramiding of debt, ignored risk and 
irrational pricing. The private equity funds may have found other ways to 
redistribute our collective wealth into their private pockets as well. 
One possibility is that, even after a full generation, it is still possible to 
deceive employees by the basic gimmick of replacing equity with debt. 
When a company earns profits, employees often feel entitled to share in it. 
But if the same company, selling the same product at the same price with 
the same real cost structure, replaces its equity with debt, it can—simply by 
renaming the money it pays out to investors “interest” rather than 
“dividends”—run smaller profits or even losses even as it pays the same or 
more money out to investors. Without profits or with losses, it should be 
able to appeal to employee’s local patriotism, team spirit, or simple fear of 
institutional collapse, restructuring or layoffs, to work together to pull the 
company out of its crisis. To the extent that this works, employees may be 
willing to work harder for less funds than prior to the recapitalization. The 
surplus extracted from them can then be transferred to others—in the early 
leveraged buyouts, to the investors; today, to the private equity fund 
managers. On this view, one key to the success of private equity is that, like 
other highly leveraged forms, it allows business managers to extract more 
work from employees for the same or less pay, without leading to the 
immediate unrest that more obviously exploitative methods do. In the 
medium run, however, two questions predominate. First, how long will this 
deception work? Second, what are the broader social implications of major 
corporations treating their employees as mere inputs to be exploited to the 
maximum degree possible, while simultaneously seeking to enlist those 
same people as team-members willing to sacrifice for the good of the very 
firm that is treating them as opponents? 
The principal story I have concentrated on in this essay, however, 
focuses on the people at the top. The rise of private equity appears to be 
driven by a new form of private interestedness best described as corporate 
corruption. One classic way for governments to fail is for office-holders to 
view their office as a means for private enrichment rather than public 
service. As Idi Amin demonstrated most dramatically, but many other 
dictators and nomenklatura have found, it is almost always possible for a 
small elite to become extraordinarily rich if they are willing to ruin the vast 
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bulk of the economy in the process. In the political sphere, part of the 
corruption problem is that once officials begin to see their offices as private 
enfeoffments entitling them to personal wealth, whether from bribery, 
skimming, Boss Tweed’s “clean” graft and its modern counterpart in the K 
Street Project (directing government jobs and contracts to friends and 
supporters), they must fear that others will demand a turn as well. Short 
terms of office in a corrupt system, however, are even worse than long ones, 
as each office holder seeks to enrich himself as quickly as possible with no 
thought for the long term. In the long term, someone else will be in office. 
Apres moi, le deluge.116
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